1 BEFORE THE SHORELINES HEARINGS BOARD 2 STATE OF WASHINGTON ITN THE MATTER OF A SHORELINE VARIANCE PERMIT DENIED BY MASON COUNTY TO DONALD W. and MARJORIE SCHUMSKY, DONALD W. and MARJORIE SCHUMSKY, 7 Appellants, SHB No. 83-11 ٧. FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER MASON COUNTY and STATE OF WASHINGTON, DEPARTMENT OF 10ECOLOGY, Respondents. 11 12 13 This matter, the appeal of a shoreline variance denial of a deck addition by Mason County, came on for hearing before the Shorelines 15 Hearings Board; Lawrence J. Faulk, presiding, Nancy Burnett, Richard A. O'Meal, David Akana, and Gayle Pothrock, on November 8, 16 1983, at Lacey, Washington. The proceedings were officially reported 17

18 by Kim Otis and were also electronically recorded.

Appellants Donald and Marjorie Schumsky were represented by R. Bruce Harrod. Respondent Mason County was represented by John Buckwalter, and co-respondent Department of Ecology was represented by Assistant Attorney General Patricia H. O'Brien.

Witnesses were sworn and testified. Exhibits were admitted and reviewed and oral argument was heard. Two notions were heard and each denied. From the testimony, evidence and argument the Board makes these

FINDINGS OF FACT

The subject development is a deck located in Mason County on the south shore of Hood Canal approximately five miles northeast of Union on Highway 106. The local shorelines master program designation of the area is urban; Hood Canal itself is a shoreline of statewide significance as designated in the Shorelines Management Act. Lots on either side of the lot are currently vacant. Hearby lots are developed.

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Appellants seek a variance for their existing waterward trapezoid-shaped deck which they built without a permit. The deck measures 13' x 19' x 18' x 18', equaling 300 square feet in surface area. It extends 18 feet waterward of the existing bulkhead. Just one piling supports the portion of the deck that is over water. The remainder of the subject deck lies landward between the bulkhead and the residence to which it is attached.

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Mason County issued a permit to the appellants in July of 1980 for the construction of an 80-foot pile pier, gangway, and float on this same property. The permit did not include a deck or any other residential addition. The appellants built the permitted pier in the fall of 1981, and then added the waterward deck during the following spring. Appellants claim the deck addition was partly embarked upon to replace some deteriorating timbers and that an unidentified public official in Shelton advised them such a deck addition would be permissible.

IV

Mason County officials discovered the unauthorized Jeck in summer of 1982 and notified appellants that a variance was required if the deck were to continue to exist. Appellants applied for a shoreline warrance on August 25, 1932, from the Mason County Commissioners.

V

Appellants have owned and used the property since 1972. Attached to the residence is a floating pier which provides moorage and water access. Appellants currently have reasonable use of their property without the unauthorized deck.

VI

The Mason County Shorelines Advisory Board recontended denial of appellants' application for a variance. The Mason County Commissioners agreed and rejected the variance application, aithough they did not issue any findings of fact or state any particular FINAL FINDINGS OF PACE,

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1 supporting reasons on the record. (A custom now being followed by most Washington counties and cities for shoreline area permits is the 3 issuance of findings and conclusions, written or oral.) 4 VII 5 Any Conclusion of Law which should be deemed a Finding of Fact is 6 hereby adopted as such. 7 From these Findings the Board comes to these 8 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 9 Ι 10 The Shorelines Hearings Board reviews applications for shoreline 11 permits on a de novo basis, conscious, of course, that the burden of 12 proof is on the appellant; it does not review local government 13 decisions only to determine if such decisions were arbitrary and 14 capricious or clearly erroneous. 15 ΙI 16The Mason County Shoreline Master Plan (MCSMP) prohibits 17 residential structures within the shoreline setback and waterward of 18 the ordinary high water mark (OWHil). 19 The MCSAP defines "structure": 20 Structure means anything constructed, erected, or located on the ground or water, or attached to the 21 ground or to an existing structure, including but not limited to residences, apartments, barns, stores, 22 offices, factories, sheds, cabins, mobile and floating homes, and other buildings. 23 The subject deck is attached to appellants' residence and 24 supported over the water. Because of its location and configuration, 25

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appellants' deck falls within the MCSMP definition of a structure. As a structure, provisions that regulate the same apply to it. Calling the structure a "doc!" or part of the "pier" will not change its character nor will it cause provisions that are only applicable to "piers" to be applicable to "decks."

The MCSMP provides shoreline setbacks for residential structures:

Setbacks - the minimum setback for buildings shall be 15 feet from the line of ordinary high water, provided that structures shall not extend beyond the common line of neighboring structures, and new construction shall not substantially reduce the view of the neighboring structures. (Section 7.20.010(c))

Variances are required for any structure to exist within the shoreline setback area. Appellants' deck is a structure that requires a variance because it lies within the 15-foot shoreline setback and extends out past the OWBM. MCSMP 7.16.200 The deck must meet MCSMP variance criteria before the deck can be allowed to remain. The MCSMP allows variances to be granted under the following criteria:

> Variances deal with specific requirements of this ordinance and the objective is to grant relief when there are practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships in the way of carrying out the strict The property owner must letter of this ordinance. show that if he complies with the provisions, he cannot make any reasonable use of his property. The fact that he might make a greater profit by using his property in a manner contrary to the intent of the ordinance is not a sufficient reason for a variance. A variance will only be granted after the applicant can demonstrate the following:

> A) The hardship which serves as a basis for the granting of a variance is specifically related to the property of the applicant. B) The hardship results from the application of

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the requirements of the Shoreline Management Act and this ordinance, and not from, for example, deed restrictions or the applicant's own actions.

- C) The variance granted will be in harmony with the general purpose and intent of this ordinance.
- D) Public welfare and interest will be preserved; if more harm will be done to the area by granting the variance than would be done to the applicant by denying it, the variance will be denied. MCSMP Section 7.28.020.

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To prevail, appellant must show that without the variance, he cannot make any reasonable use of his property. If he cannot do so, the application must be denied. If he can do so, he must also prove that the proposal meets the requirements of Section 7.28.020(A, B, C, & D).

Drake v. Mason County, SHE No. 83-4.

In addition to proving preclusion from a reasonable use of the property, appellants must prove that their alleged hardship is specifically related to the property.

Here, the appellants built a structure in the setback area partly to replace some deteriorating timbers and partly to secure an addition and enjoy an enlarged platform area. The deck addition merely expanded the area for enjoyment. The denial of a variance would not prevent a reasonable use of the property.

IV

Next, appellants must prove that they will suffer a hardship if the variance is denied. In the instant case, appellants claim a hardship because of they will be compelled to remove the deck unless they are granted a variance. Their alleged hardship stems only from their own actions and not from the property or the SMA. Hardships

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which result from appellant's own doing are not reasons for a variance

V

Those who seek variances must also prove that their proposed structures are in harmony with the surrounding area and are within the intent of the ordinance. Photos of nearby and more distant over-the-water structures were presented by appellants to show that their structure is generally in harmony with the surrounding area. Although over-the-water structures do exist in the area, most of them predate the SMA or the enactment of the MCSMP. While the subject deck addition strikes no apparent disharmony in the surrounding area, the proposed addition does not meet the intent of the ordinance (the MCSMP). That intent prohibits a residential deck within the setback area and over water. Accordingly, the development is inconsistent with MCSMP 7.28 020(c).

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appellants must also meet criteria (D). Upon examining the evidence, the Board finds the deck to set an undesireable precedent under the MCSMP for construction past the OWNM and within the shoreline setback line. Granting a variance for this deck would establish an undesireable (and unlawful) precedent for the granting of requests for similar decks. The cumulative impact of many over-the-water decks would be precisely what the SMA was enacted to prevent: piecemeal and uncoordinated development. RCM 90.58.020.

VII

Hood Canal is a shoreline of statewide significance (SSWS).

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Development on a SSWS should especially reflect statewide interests of planned development. RCW 90.58.020. The MCSMP reflects Mason County's planning for this special shoreline. A variance in this instance would be contrary to the public interest of the MCSMP. lIIV All MCSMP variance criteria must be met before a variance may be granted. Appellants have failed to show that their deck meets any of the variance criteria. Accordingly, Mason County's denial of the variance should be affirmed. ΙX Any Finding of Fact which should be deemed a Conclusion of Law is hereby adopted as such. From these Conclusions the Board enters this 20°

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	ORDER
2	The instant variance application decision by the Mason County
3	Commission is affirmed.
4	DATED this 2/st day of Secenber, 1983
5	SHORELINES HEARINGS BOARD
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10	DAVID AKANA, Lawyer Member
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12	NANCY R. BURNETT, Member
13	WHICH R. BURNING
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15	RICHARD A. O'NEAL, Member
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17	See dissenting opinion LAWRENCE J. FAULK, Member
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DISSENTING OPINION - LAWRENCE J. FAULK

In the Spring of 1981, appellant discovered dry rot on the existing deck. Appellant thereupon replaced the existing deck and extended the deck approximately 18 feet to the north and behind the existing deck.

This was accomplished without obtaining a building permit or shorelines approval, although appellant testified that he obtained verbal approval from Mason County.

In the Fall of 1982, the deck was discovered by the Corps of Engineers. On October 15, 1982, DOS indicated they had no objection to issuance of a Corps Section 10 Permit to appellant.

On November 18, 1932, appellant applied for a shoreline variance from the Mason County Shoreline Masic: Program (MCSMP). On December 23, 1932, the Mason County Shorelines Advisor; Board recommended devial of appellant's application.

On January 24, 1983, the Masor County Commissioners agreed and rejected appellant's application. On March 3, 1983, appellant appealed to this Board within the 30 days allowed from the time DOE received the decision of the commissioners. The case was heard on November 8, 1983, by the Shorelines Hearings Board.

The deck is compatible with existing structures and uses in the area. The appellant showed there are "practical difficulties and unnecessary hardships in carrying out the strict letter of the ordinance, as the majority would have him do. (Variance Section MCSMP.) The practical effect of denying the variance is to possibly

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force the appellant to tear down the 18' deck extension. This is not a reasonable remedy in my opinion and represents an unnecessary hardship on the appellant.

The cumulative impact of granting this variance, where a lot has already been developed for residential use under proper authority as has this lot, would be small because the area on the south shore of Hoods Canal has already been heavily developed, under proper or improper authority, as the photographs (Exhibit A-5) indicated

The evidence shows the deck is not visible from the highway so it does not obstruct the view of passers by who are visiting the area. Because appellant owns both lots on either side of subject property the deck does not obstruct the view of adjacent lots, as the majority seems to indicate. Finally there are other developments that extend further into the water on either side of appellant's lots.

Be that as it may, I think we, as a Board have a duty to interpret and apply the statutes in a manner that furthers justice.

Other people in the area enjoy the use of similar structures. I can see no reason to deny appellant the rightful use of his property.

I believe appellant did meet the hardship criteria for granting a variance and therefore disagree with the majority decision and believe the Board should reverse the County's decision and grant the variance for this already constructed section of the decision.

LAWRENCE J. FAUL, Hember

DISSENTING OPINION
LAWRENCE J. FAULK
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